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Land development has been a critical driver of China¡¯s economic growth, while simultaneously serving as a primary source of grievances and resistance among rural farmers. Existing studies have largely focused on peasant resistance and local governments¡¯ responses, leaving a gap in understanding the role of the central government and its interactions with local authorities in shaping policies. This study analyzes the land expropriation system reforms led by China¡¯s central government and investigates how central-local government relations influence policy changes in land expropriation. It reveals that the central government has promoted peasant-friendly reforms to prevent large-scale protests that could threaten political stability. Strengthened centralization has played a crucial role in overcoming local governments¡¯ legislative and administrative resistance to these reforms. By comparing the land expropriation reforms under Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping administrations, this study finds that enhanced centralization during the Xi administration effectively mitigated local resistance and improved the government¡¯s responsiveness to peasant demands. This research highlights the central government¡¯s role, complementing previous studies centered on local governments, and offers new insights into the dynamics of policy responsiveness in China.