?? ???, ????, ??? ?? ??? (Aesthetic Disagreement, Relativism, and Aesthetic Realism)

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In this paper, I investigate the topic of the reality of aesthetic properties. First, I outline the basic structure of the debate about aesthetic realism, which is focused upon most familiar views taken by Levinson and Goldman. In this structure, it is whether aesthetic attributions are truth-apt that determines whether aesthetic properties are real. I call this truth-aptness the ¡®Normativity Thesis¡¯. So far, the normativity thesis has been understood in terms of the concept of the objective truth. This means that one is committed to realism if aesthetic attributions are objectively truth-apt, or anti-realism otherwise. However, I challenge this objectivist commitment by arguing that truth relativism, which claims that aesthetic attributions are truth-apt relative to contexts of assessors, gives the best explanation for the normativity thesis. If this argument is successful, objectivism does not necessarily imply realism any longer, thereby the possibility of aesthetic realism is still open to truth relativism. In this new picture, I criticize a relativist offer that aesthetic properties are self-ascriptive properties, and put forward an alternative propsal that they are evaluative properties.