Highlighting the Reasons behind the Egyptians’ Disillusionment with the Muslim Brotherhood after 2011

On December 25, 2013, the military-backed interim government in Egypt designated the MB as a terrorist organization following the overthrow of President Morsi. This pronouncement has broad geographical ramifications.
Even though the movement had never officially acquired judicial approval for its years of political activity, throughout President Gamal Abdel Nasser's administration until President Hosni Mubarak, the state and society had at least partially recognized it. The group was not classified as a terrorist organization or a danger to national security. The regime's justification that the MB is an inherent danger to the nation did not only make repressive measures against the group legitimate but also enabled popular support for repression. The Brotherhood's prosecution in Egypt has been severe, thanks in part to the labeling of the organization as a terrorist organization.
This paper will examine how the internal politics of Islamists influence their actions, choices, and strategy. More specifically, it looks at how internal factors affect Islamists' external conduct. It investigates the influences of institutional and organizational elements on Islamist rhetoric, behavior, strategy, power dynamics, decision-making procedures, and leadership.