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The application of competition law to digital platforms necessitates distinct analytical frameworks owing to their inherent characteristics as multi-sided markets and the presence of lock-in effects. The increasing market concentration among dominant digital platforms, colloquially termed "big tech," has emerged as a focal point of regulatory scrutiny across multiple jurisdictions, including Korea. This has precipitated varied regulatory responses, with some nations pursuing novel legislative frameworks while others opt for the modification and enhancement of existing competition statutes.
The regulatory dichotomy between implementing new platform-specific legislation versus adapting conventional antitrust frameworks necessitates rigorous debate regarding the differentiation of market power determinants and abusive conduct in platform economies. The apparent lacuna in such theoretical discourse may explicate concerns regarding the Korea Fair Trade Commission's (KFTC) legislative enhancement initiatives, particularly whether these remain constrained by traditional competition and consumer protection paradigms, or whether they prioritize enforcement efficacy through modified presumptions of dominance and burden-of-proof allocations.
The KFTC's promulgation of the 2023 Guidelines for Online Platform Screening, designed to augment existing market dominance abuse criteria under the MRFTA, underscores the imperative for systematic case law development in platform regulation. Critical to this development is the establishment of consensus regarding appropriate regulatory parameters, particularly given the potential for market-specific anticompetitive conduct, notwithstanding platforms' relatively modest contribution to aggregate economic output.
This consideration assumes heightened significance in contexts where domestic platforms engage in direct competition with international counterparts. Such scenarios demand careful calibration between market efficiency optimization and disruption minimization. Indeed, an overly restrictive regulatory approach toward domestic platforms, characterized by undifferentiated oversight mechanisms, risks impeding innovation trajectories and growth potential within the sector.