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In this paper, I aim to critically examine Laidman's position, which seeks to strengthen the standpoint of structural realism from an epistemological structural realism to an ontological structural realism. In my opinion, the attempt to strengthen structural realism to the ontological dimension cannot be philosophically justified, as epistemological structural realism itself can remain a sufficiently robust realism. In response to this, one might argue that epistemological structural realism is not significantly different from constructive empiricism. Indeed, Van Frassen attempted to demonstrate in his 2006 paper that even from the perspective of empiricism, the concept of ¡°structure¡± as posited by structural realism can be incorporated.
However, such attempts by constructive empiricism to incorporate structural realism are bound to fail for two reasons. First, constructive empiricism still cannot evade the demand of the ¡°no miracle argument,¡± whereas structural realism does not face this problem. Second, based on historical case studies in the philosophy of science, epistemological structural realism serves as a crucial element in the advancement of fundamental science, while constructive empiricism fails to fulfill such a function. Therefore, epistemological structural realism is clearly distinct from constructive empiricism, and it can be considered a metaphysical research program that possesses relative superiority compared to constructive empiricism.