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We will briefly examine the relationship between physicalism and mental realism. The mental realist argues that the mind is real. Physicalism holds that everything is physical. However, since the mind is non-physical, mental realism and physicalism seem incompatible. Unlike dualism and eliminativism, which see this theoretical tension as real rather than seeming, some physicalists argue that the unnatural matching of these theories is only superficial and say that physicalism and mental realism are compatible. According to non-reductionism, physicalism can be maintained where the mind exists, and according to reductionism, the mind exists when there are just physical things. After all, both non-reductionist physicalism and reductionist physicalism claim to be able to maintain both physicalism and mental realism, so how is this possible? Here I will show that if the distinction between substantive physicalism and attribute physicalism, between eliminative reduction and conservative reduction, and between existence and reality becomes clear, the compatibility advocated by the two camps is secured. However, when the criteria for the reality of the mind are clearly revealed, the two physicalisms are in different dialectic situations. Insofar as mental causality is taken as the criterion of reality, non- reductionist physicalism seems to find it difficult to fit naturally with mental realism, contrary to common expectations and assessments. Thus, from a purely compatibility point of view, it turns out that the reductionist position is more favorable.