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Until now, attempts to characterize analytic philosophy as a single feature have repeatedly failed. There seems to be virtually no philosophical views or methods shared by all analytic philosophers. Therefore, it seems very difficult, or even impossible, to find a single feature that unifies analytic philosophy.
However, after the 1970s, the atmosphere that considers ��intuition�� as a method of analytic philosophy began to appear more and more prominently. Although no one mentioned the proper method of analytic philosophy, which is endorsed without objection in analytic philosophy, recent analytic philosophers have quite a lot of cases appealing to intuition when developing philosophical theory. They seem to think that philosophical activities through traditional conceptual analysis, reflective equilibrium, and thought experiments are based on ��intuition.�� Eventually, the appeal to intuition yields the impression that it is quite common enough to say that it constitutes the characteristics of contemporary analytic philosophy as a whole.
However, some philosophers have expressed skeptical views of intuition. Among them, H.Cappelen is a leading philosopher who argues that dependence on intuition is not an essential characteristic of philosophy. He examined a wide range of cases in which philosophers seemed to rely on intuition as a source of evidence in their arguments, and argued that contrary to the original appearance, they did not rely on what could adequately be called ��intuition.�� So he has argued that intuition in philosophy is not actually used as evidence.
This paper attempts to refute Cappelen's skepticism about intuition, examine and defend the concept of intuition as part of philosophical method. But before we look at Cappellen's skeptical arguments, I will first explain how intuition is used in philosophy through one of the examples (the Gettier case) that many analytic philosophers regard as the paradigm case of the use of intuition and a breakthrough in analytic philosophy. It then presents Capellen's skeptical arguments and their rationale, and then reviews the argument. Finally, through an alternative explanation to intuition, it advocates the role of intuition in philosophy by presenting reasons that philosophers think they actually depend on intuition as evidence.