??? ???? ??? ?? (A Practical Limit of Perspectival Realism)

????? ??? ?????? ???? ?? ??? ??? ?????? ??? ?? ??? ? ??? ?????. ??? ?? ???? ?????? ??? ??? ??? ?? ??? ?? ?????? ??? ? ??? ?????? ??? ???? ??? ???? ??? ????. ?? ?????? ?? ??? ?? ???? ???? ????? ??? ??? ?????? ??? ?? ??? ? ??? ????. ??? ???? ?? ? ??? ?? ? ??. ??? ???? ?????? ??? ??? ?? ??? ?? ??? ?? ??? ??? ??? ?????? ? ???? ????? ???? ??? ??? ??? ? ??? ???. ?? ??, ??? ???? ?? ??? ?????? ???? ??? ??? ???? ???, ???? ???? ??? ???? ??? ?? ?? ??? ?? ?? ???? ?????? ??? ? ??, ?? ?? ?-??? ?(truth across perspectives)?? ??? ???? ????. ?? ???? ???? ?? ??? ????, ????? ??? ???? ??? ??? ??? ?? ??? ??? ?? ????? ???? ??? ??? ??? ???? ? ?? ??? ???? ??? ?????? ????.

Traditionally, scientific realists have claimed that truth of our best current theory is inferable from their success. Thomas Kuhn¡¯s tenet of methodological incommensurability challenges to the legitimacy of this inference, revealing the perspective-dependency of evaluating the successfulness of a theory. Rejoinders of realists who accept the Kuhnean insight are divided into two classes. One of them is to privilege today¡¯s point of view, so that asserts that a theory successful from today¡¯s viewpoint can be rationally believed to be approximately true. On contrary, so-called perspectival realists like Michela Massimi refute the vantage point of view. Nevertheless, they insist that if a scientific claim used by a certain perspective can be assessed by another, then it can be considered as successful across perspectives, and then, as truth across perspectives. In this paper, I shall point out a practical limit of perspectival realism in assessing from a certain viewpoint a scientific claim used by a diachronically distinct one. If successful, this limit may force us to privilege today¡¯s scientific perspective. Consequently, I argue that realists¡¯ strategies, so long as accommodating the Kuhnean insight, depend upon the plausibility of the claim that postulates a vantage point of view.