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In this essay, I show the inadequacy of Michael Slote��s arguments for the impossibility of perfection and impracticality of moral self-cultivation.
For this aim, first, I briefly introduce the development of his sentimentalist virtue theory, which has woven the notions of virtue, moral sentiment, and empathy, along with care ethics for several decades. This investigation tells us that his virtue theory has a merit to entrust the moral foundation to agents�� inner states and thus respect their subjectivity, unlike eudaimonism that relies on the Aristotelian ��agent- focused�� notions of virtue. To strengthen the merit of his agent-based virtue theory, Slote recently argues against the ideas of human perfection and moral self-cultivation, which would constitute the essence of ancient virtue ethical approaches, including Confucianism. Such ideal postulates for moral self-improvement, according to him, can be disproven not only by assuming the possible conflicts between contrasting virtues, in an agent which would debunk the possibility of perfection, but also by contemporary psychological researches about moral education that doubts the feasibility of voluntary self-shaping. Slote��s attempt, if successful, would deny the significance of self-regarding moral cultivation with an aspiration for perfection, central to ancient views of human flourishing. I argue, however, that his arguments are not well-founded enough to discredit such notions of perfection and cultivation in our moral practice. The impossibility of perfection is hardly vindicated merely with his critical evidence of an unavoidable conflict between the virtues of frankness and tactfulness, given Aristoteles��s emphasis of practical wisdom (phronesis) residing in such individual virtues. Moreover, his reference to psychological researches is also unable to substantiate the impracticality of moral self-cultivation because of their limitations as empirical studies mostly based on children��s temporary behaviors. Contra Slote��s anti-teleological views, I believe, holding such notions of human perfection and self -cultivation in our minds is much more beneficial than abandoning them for us to become a virtuous person, which is the practical goal of virtue ethics.